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Abstract
The paper characterizes the position value and the Myerson value for communication situations.
The position value is originally de¯ned as the sum of half the Shapley value of the link games but
is also represented by the Shapley value of a modi¯cation of the link games. That modi¯cation is
called the divided link games. In addition, by constructing coalition structures of the divided links
from original communication situations, two types of the Shapley value (the Owen value/the two-
step Shapley value) of the divided link games with coalition structures coincide with the Myerson
value of the original communication situations. Thus, the di®erence between the two values is due
to the existence of a coalition structure.
Keywords: position value; Myerson value; coalition structure
JEL classi¯cation: C71
1 Introduction
The in°uence of cooperation and communication between agents in economic or social problems is
well described by communication situations introduced by Myerson (1977). He de¯ned an allocation
rule for communication situations called the Myerson value. An alternative allocation rule called the
position value was given by Borm et al. (1992). Both allocation rules were subsequently characterized
axiomatically in several ways. Two axiomatic characterizations of the Myerson value were provided by
Myerson (1977, 1980), while an axiomatic characterization of the position value was provided by Slikker
(2005).1 Non-axiomatically, Casajus (2007) characterized the position value by the Myerson value of a
modi¯cation of communication situations called the link agent form.
In this paper, we provide uni¯ed and non-axiomatic characterizations of the two allocation rules. As
in the case of the de¯nitions of the two allocation rules, in our characterizations, each allocation rule
is characterized by (the sum of) the Shapley value of a game obtained from the original communica-
tion situation. For each allocation rule, the modi¯ed games, obtained from the same communication
situation, is the same, irrespective of the existence of a coalition structure. For the position value, the
modi¯ed game is called divided link game. The position value is represented as the sum of the Shapley
value of the divided link game, whereas, for the Myerson value, the modi¯ed game is called divided link
game with a coalition structure. The Myerson value is represented as the sum of the Shapley value of
the divided link game with a coalition structure. There are two types of the Shapley value of the games
with coalition structures: the Owen value, introduced by Owen (1977); and the two-step Shapley value,
introduced by Kamijo (2007). In our modi¯cation, both values characterize the Myerson value; thus,
the di®erence in the characterizations of the two allocation rules is simply the existence of coalition
structures.
The paper is organized as follows. Basic de¯nitions and notations are given in the next section.
Characterizations of the position value and the Myerson value is given in Section 3 and 4, respectively,
¤Graduate school of Economics, Waseda University, 1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, Japan. E-mail:
kongo takumi@toki.waseda.jp
1Borm et al. (1992) axiomatically characterized both values in a restricted class.
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and another characterization of the position value is given in Section 5. Additional remarks are provided
in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
A cooperative game with transferable utility or simply a game is a pair (N; v) where N = f1; : : : ; ng is
a ¯nite set of players and v : 2N ! R is a function with v(;) = 0. Let jN j = n where j ¢ j represents the
cardinality of the set. A subset S of N is called a coalition and v(S) is the worth of the coalition. A game
(N; v) is zero-normalized if for any i 2 N , v(fig) = 0. In this paper, we consider only zero-normalized
games. A set of all zero-normalized games is denoted by G. Assuming that the grand coalition N will be
formed, the problem of allocation of the worth v(N) among the players arises. One of the widely used
allocation rules of the games is the Shapely value, introduced by Shapley (1953). Let ¼ be a permutation
on N and ¦(N) be a set of all permutations on N . Given ¼ and for any i 2 N , a player j 2 N that
satis¯es ¼(j) < ¼(i) is called a predecessor of i in ¼. Let
m¼i (N; v) = v(fj 2 N j¼(j) · ¼(i)g)¡ v(fj 2 N j¼(j) < ¼(i)g)
be i's marginal contributions for ¼ in (N; v). Given a game (N; v) 2 G, the Shapley value Á(N; v) =
(Á1(N; v); Á2(N; v); : : : ; Án(N; v)) is de¯ned by
Ái(N; v) =
1
j¦(N)j
X
¼2¦(N)
m¼i (N; v);
for any i 2 N .
Given a player set N , let C = fC1; C2; : : : ; Cmg be a coalition structure of N , that is, for any
Ch; Ck 2 C with h 6= k, Ch \ Ck = ; and
S
Ch2C Ch = N . A triple (N; v;C) is a game with a
coalition structure, and a set of all games with coalition structures is denoted by GC. Generalizations of
the Shapley value to games with coalition structures has been presented by Owen (1977) and Kamijo
(2007), called the Owen value and the two-step Shapley value, respectively.
In the Owen value, the set of permutations on N is restricted by the coalition structure. A permuta-
tion ¼ 2 ¦(N) is consistent with C if for any i; j; k 2 N with ¼(i) < ¼(j) < ¼(k) and i; k 2 Ch 2 C, then
j 2 Ch. In other words, ¼ is consistent with C if players in the same element of the coalition structure
appear successively in ¼. Let §(N;C) be a set of all permutations on N , which is consistent with C.
Given a game (N; v;C) 2 GC, the Owen value Ã(N; v;C) = (Ã1(N; v;C); Ã2(N; v;C); : : : ; Ãn(N; v;C))
is de¯ned by
Ãi(N; v;C) =
1
j§(N;C)j
X
¼2§(N;C)
m¼i (N; v);
for any i 2 N .
In the two-step Shapley value, a game (N; v;C) 2 GC is treated as having two steps. For the ¯rst
step, we consider the games restricted within each element of the coalition structure. Players in Ch 2 C
participate in a game (Ch; vjCh) where vjCh is a restriction of v on Ch, that is, vjCh(S) = v(S) for any
S µ Ch. For the second step, we consider the game between elements of the coalition structure. The
game is called the intermediate game or the quotient game and is de¯ned as a pair (M;vM ) where M
is a set of indices of the coalition structure C and vM (S) = v(
S
h2S Ch) for any S µM . Given a game
(N; v;C) 2 GC, the two-step Shapley value Â(N; v;C) = (Â1(N; v;C); Â2(N; v;C); : : : ; Ân(N; v;C)) is
de¯ned by
Âi(N; v;C) = Ái(Ch; vjCh) +
Áh(M;vM )¡ v(Ch)
jChj ;
for any i 2 N with i 2 Ch 2 C.
Given a player set N , the bilateral communication channels between the players in N are described
by a graph L µ ffi; jgji; j 2 N; i 6= jg. Each element of the graph represents a communication channel
between the two players and is called a link. For convenience, each link is represented as ` instead
of fi; jg when there is no possibility of confusion. Given a graph L, if there exists a ¯nite sequence
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of players i1; : : : ; iH such that i1 = i; iH = j and fih; ih+1g 2 L for any h = 1; : : : ;H ¡ 1, then i is
connected to j in the graph. Given a graph L, let
N=L = ffj 2 N ji is connected to j in Lg [ figji 2 Ng:
N=L represents the collection of sets of connected players in L. For any S µ N , let L(S) = ffi; jg 2
Lji; j 2 Sg which is a restriction of L on S. By L(S), S=L is de¯ned in the same manner as N=L, that
is,
S=L = ffj 2 Sji is connected to j in L(S)g [ figji 2 Sg:
A triple (N; v; L) is called a communication situation and a set of all communication situations is denoted
by CS. Allocation rules widely used in communication situations are the Myerson value introduced by
Myerson (1977) and the position value introduced by Borm et al. (1992). Both are derived from the
Shapley value of games obtained from original communication situations.
In the Myerson value, a communication situation (N; v; L) is modi¯ed as a graph-restricted game
(N; vL), where the function vL : 2N ! R is de¯ned by
vL(S) =
X
T2S=L
v(T );
for any S µ N . This de¯nition re°ects the restriction of cooperation in a graph, that is, in a coalition
S, only those players who are connected with each other in L(S) can cooperate in the coalition. Given a
communication situation (N; v; L) 2 CS, theMyerson value ¹(N; v; L) = (¹1(N; v; L); ¹2(N; v; L); : : : ; ¹n(N; v; L))
is de¯ned by
¹i(N; v; L) = Ái(N; vL);
for any i 2 N .
On the other hand, in the position value, the role of each link in a graph is emphasized more than
it is in the Myerson value. For the position value, a communication situation (N; v; L) is transformed
into a link game (L;w) where the function w : 2L ! R is de¯ned by
w(L0) = vL
0
(N);
for any L0 µ L. The function w represents the worth of sets of links. Given a communication situation
(N; v; L) 2 CS, the position value ¿(N; v; L) = (¿1(N; v; L); ¿2(N; v; L); : : : ; ¿n(N; v; L)) is de¯ned by
¿i(N; v; L) =
X
`2Li
1
2
Á`(L;w);
where Li = ffi; jg 2 Ljj 2 Ng, for any i 2 N .
3 Characterization of the position value
From this point on, we consider only graphs in which all players in N have at least one link.2
In the position value, the Shapley value that a link ` receives in the link games is equally divided
between two players who form the link. This de¯nition re°ects the assumption that each link is composed
of two players cooperation, and the contributions of the two players toward maintaining the link are
considered to be the same. If we divide each link into two in advance and de¯ne a game on the set of
divided links, the position value of the original communication situation is represented by the Shapley
value of the game.
Given a graph L, we divide each link fi; jg into two as ij and ji. A divided link ij can be interpreted
as an unilateral communication channel from i to j. Let D = fij; jijfi; jg 2 Lg be a set of all divided
2This restriction is just a simpli¯cation of the discussion hereafter. Because of component decomposability and com-
ponent e±ciency (see van den Nouweland (1993)), players who form no link have no e®ect on the others and obtain the
value of a stand-alone coalition in both the Myerson value and the position value. Thus, if there exist some players who
form no link, the deletion of such players from a communication situation is not signi¯cant, and the restricted situation
can be considered on only the set of players who have at least one link.
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links in L. An element of D is also represented as d for convenience. As in the link games, a pair (D;u)
is a divided link game where u : 2D ! R is de¯ned by,
u(D0) = w(ffi; jgjij 2 D0 and ji 2 D0g);
for any D0 µ D.
The following is an example of the divided link game.
Example 1. Let N = f1; 2; 3g, v(S) = 0 if jSj = 1, v(S) = 1 if jSj = 2, v(N) = 4 and L =
ff1; 2g; f2; 3gg. Then, D = f12; 21; 23; 32g and
u(D0) =
8><>:
4 if D0 = D
1 if D0 = f12; 21g; f23; 32g; f12; 21; 23g; f12; 21; 32g; f12; 23; 32g; f21; 23; 32g
0 otherwise :
For the divided link games, the following holds.
Theorem 1. For any (N; v; L) 2 CS and any i 2 N ,
¿i(N; v; L) =
X
d2Di
Ád(D;u);
where Di = fij 2 Djj 2 Ng.
Proof. Let f : ¦(D) ! ¦(L) be de¯ned as follows: For any fi; jg; fi0; j0g 2 L, (f(¼))(fi; jg) <
(f(¼))(fi0; j0g) if and only if
¼(ij) < ¼(i0j0) and ¼(ji) < ¼(i0j0) or ¼(ij) < ¼(j0i0) and ¼(ji) < ¼(j0i0):
By de¯nition, in f(¼) 2 ¦(L), a link fi; jg precedes a link fi0; j0g when its two parts ij and ji precede
either i0j0 or j0i0 in ¼ 2 ¦(D).
For any ¼ 2 ¦(D) and any ij 2 D, if ji is a predecessor of ij in ¼ then m¼ij(D;u) = mf(¼)fi;jg(L;w).
Similarly, if ij is a predecessor of ji in ¼, m¼ij(D;u) = 0. Thus,
m¼ij(D;u) +m
¼
ji(D;u) = m
f(¼)
fi;jg(L;w):
Since f is a onto mapping and j¦(D)j ¸ j¦(L)j, some di®erent permutations on D are mapped onto
the same permutation on L. Let ¾ 2 ¦(L). The number of ¼ 2 ¦(D) that satis¯es f(¼) = ¾ is j¦(D)jj¦(L)j .
Therefore,
1
j¦(D)j
X
¼2¦(D)
³
m¼ij(D;u) +m
¼
ji(D;u)
´
=
1
j¦(L)j
X
¾2¦(L)
m¾fi;jg(L;w);
or,
Áij(D;u) + Áji(D;u) = Áfi;jg(L;w):
By the de¯nition of u, for any D0 µ Dnfij; jig, u(D0 [ fijg) = u(D0) = u(D0 [ fjig). This implies
that ij and ji are symmetric in (D;u). By symmetry of the Shapley value, Áij(D;u) = Áji(D;u). Thus,
Áij(D;u) = Áji(D;u) =
1
2
Áfi;jg(L;w);
which implies, X
d2Di
Ád(D;u) =
X
`2Li
1
2
Á`(L;w) = ¿i(N; v; L):
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4 Characterizations of the Myerson value
Next, we mention the relation between the Myerson value of communication situations and divided link
games. By de¯nition, Di \ Dj = ; for any i; j 2 N with i 6= j and
S
i2N Di = D. Consequently,
fD1; D2; : : : ; Dng is a coalition structure on D. A triple (D;u; fD1; D2; : : : ; Dng) is a divided link game
with a coalition structure. The Myerson value of communication situations is represented by the Owen
value of the divided link games with coalition structures.
Theorem 2. For any (N; v; L) 2 CS and any i 2 N ,
¹i(N; v; L) =
X
d2Di
Ãd(D;u; fD1; D2; : : : ; Dng):
Proof. By the intermediate game property of the Owen value (see p.231 of Peleg and SudhÄolter (2003)),X
d2Di
Ãd(D;u; fD1; D2; : : : ; Dng) = Ái(M;uM );
where M = f1; : : : ; ng is a set of indices of the coalition structure fD1; D2; : : : ; Dng and for any S µM ,
uM (S) = v(
S
j2S Dj).
Now, by the construction of the coalition structure, M = N . For any S µM = N ,
uM (S) = u(
[
j2S
Dj) = w(L(S)) = vL(S)(N) = vL(S)(S) +
X
j 6=S
v(fjg) = vL(S);
where the last equality holds since v is zero-normalized. Therefore, (M;uM ) = (N; vL) and hence for
any i 2 N ,
¹i(N; v; L) = Ái(N; vL) = Ái(M;uM ) =
X
d2Di
Ãk(D;u; fD1; D2; : : : ; Dng):
Similarly, the Myerson value is represented by the two-step Shapley value of the divided link games with
coalition structures.
Theorem 3. For any (N; v; L) 2 CS and any i 2 N ,
¹i(N; v; L) =
X
d2Di
Âd(D;u; fD1; D2; : : : ; Dng):
Proof. By de¯nition, it is obvious that the two-step Shapley value satis¯es the intermediate game prop-
erty. The proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 2; hence we omit it.
5 Another characterization of the position value
In the de¯nition of u, a link fi; jg is formed when both ij and ji exist. If we change the situation to \a
link fi; jg is formed when either ij or ji exists," what will change? Let u^ : 2D ! R be de¯ned by,
u^(D0) = w(ffi; jgjij 2 D0 or ji 2 D0g);
for any D0 µ D. This change corresponds to the situation in which we duplicate each link and allocate
it to each player who form the link. Thus, we call a pair (D; u^) a duplicated link game.
Example 2. Let (N; v; L) be the same as Example 1. Then,
u^(D0) =
8><>:
4 if D0 ¶ f12; 23g; f12; 32g; f21; 23g or f21; 32g
1 if D0 = f12g; f21g; f23g; f32g; f12; 21g or f23; 32g
0 if D0 = ;:
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As in Theorem 1, the position value of the communication situations is also represented by the
Shapley value of the duplicated link games.
Theorem 4. For any (N; v; L) 2 CS and any i 2 N ,
¿i(N; v; L) =
X
d2Di
Ád(D; u^):
Proof. Almost the same proof of Theorem 1 is applicable. Let g : ¦(D) ! ¦(L) be de¯ned as follows:
For any fi; jg; fi0; j0g 2 L, (g(¼))(fi; jg) < (g(¼))(fi0; j0g) if and only if
¼(ij) < ¼(i0j0) and ¼(ij) < ¼(j0i0) or ¼(ji) < ¼(i0j0) and ¼(ji) < ¼(j0i0):
By de¯nition, in g(¼) 2 ¦(L), a link fi; jg precedes a link fi0; j0g when either of its two parts ij and ji
precede both i0j0 and j0i0 in ¼ 2 ¦(D).
For any ¼ 2 ¦(D) and any ij 2 D, if ji is a predecessor of ij in ¼ then m¼ij(D; u^) = 0. Similarly, if
ij is a predecessor of ji in ¼, m¼ij(D; u^) = m
g(¼)
fi;jg(L;w). Thus,
m¼ij(D; u^) +m
¼
ji(D; u^) = m
g(¼)
fi;jg(L;w);
and by an argument similar to the proof of Theorem 1,
Áij(D; u^) + Áji(D; u^) = Áfi;jg(L;w):
By the de¯nition of u^, for any D0 µ Dnfij; jig, u^(D0 [ fijg) = w(ffh; kg 2 Ljhk 2 D0 or kh 2
D0g[fi; jg) = u^(D0[fjig): This implies that ij and ji are symmetric in (D; u^) and Áij(D; u^) = Áji(D; u^).
Thus,
Áij(D; u^) = Áji(D; u^) =
1
2
Áfi;jg(L;w);
which implies X
d2Di
Ád(D; u^) =
X
`2Li
1
2
Á`(L;w) = ¿i(N; v; L):
In the duplicated link games, however, the results that correspond to Theorem 2 and 3 are not ob-
tained, that is, the Myerson value of the communication situations is not represented by the sum of the
Owen value or the two-step Shapley value. For instance, in the case of Example 2, ¹i(N; v; L) = ( 76 ;
10
6 ;
7
6 )
but
P
d2D1 Ãd(D; u^; fD1; D2; D3g) =
P
d2D1 Âd(D; u^; fD1; D2; D3g) = 56 ,
P
d2D2 Ãd(D; u^; fD1; D2; D3g) =P
d2D2 Âd(D; u^; fD1; D2; D3g) = 146 and
P
d2D3 Ãd(D; u^; fD1; D2; D3g) =
P
d2D3 Âd(D; u^; fD1; D2; D3g) =
5
6 . It is not clear whether the allocation rule for communication situations is represented by the Owen
value or the two-step Shapley value of the duplicated link games with coalition structures.
6 Some remarks
For any ® 2 [0; 1], let
u® = ®u+ (1¡ ®)u^:
Then, by linearity of the Shapley value, the following is obtained as a corollary of Theorems 1 and 4:
Corollary 1. For any (N; v; L) 2 CS, any ® 2 [0; 1] and any i 2 N ,
¿i(N; v; L) =
X
d2Di
Ád(D;u®):
Next, we mention the coincidence between the position value and the Myerson value. By de¯nition,
both the Owen value and the two-step Shapley value coincide with the Shapley value if a coalition
structure is either the coarsest or the ¯nest, that is, if the coalition structure is composed of the grand
coalition or singletons. In our settings, the coalition structure D is the coarsest if and only if D = ;,
and is the ¯nest if and only if each player has at most one link. This implies the following as a corollary
to Theorems 1, 2, and 3:
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Corollary 2. The position value coincides with the Myerson value for any communication situation if
and only if each player has at most one link.
Lastly, we mention a generalization of our results. Communication situations were generalized as
hypergraph communication situations by van den Nouweland et al. (1992). They extended both the
Myerson value and the position value to the hypergraph communication situations. We can extend
our results to hypergraph communication situations in a similar way, that is, the position value of
hypergraph communication situations is represented as the sum of the Shapley value of the divided or
duplicated hyperlink games and the Myerson value of hypergraph communication situations is represented
as the sum of the Owen value/the two-step Shapley value of the divided hyperlink games with coalition
structures.
Acknowledgment: The author thanks Yukihiko Funaki, Yoshio Kamijo, Ren¶e van den Brink and
Gerard van der Laan for helpful comments and discussions.
References
Borm P, Owen G, Tijs S (1992) On the position value for communication situations. SIAM Journal of
Discrete Mathematics 5:305{320
Casajus A (2007) The position value is the Myerson value, in a sense. International Journal of Game
Theory 36:47{55
Kamijo Y (2007) A Two-step Shapley Value in a Cooperative Game with a Coalition Structure.
21 COE-GLOPE Working Paper Series No.28, Waseda University, Japan, DOI: http://21coe-
glope.com/paper/21COE WP28.pdf.
Myerson RB (1977) Graphs and cooperation in games. Mathematics of Operations Research 2:225{229
Myerson RB (1980) Conference structure and fair allocation rules. International Journal of Game Theory
9:169{182
Owen G (1977) Value of games with a priori unions. In: Henn R, Moesechlin O (eds.) Mathematical
economics and game theory, Springer-Verlag
Peleg B, SudhÄolter P (2003) Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games, Kluwer Academc Pub-
lishers
Shapley LS (1953) A value for n-person games. In: Roth AE (ed.) The Shapley value, Cambridge
University Press pp. 41{48
Slikker M (2005) A characterization of the position value. International Journal of Game Theory 33:505{
514
van den Nouweland A (1993) Games and graphs in economic situations. PhD dissertation, Tilburg
University, the Netherland
van den Nouweland A, Borm P, Tijs S (1992) Allocation rules for hypergraph communication situations.
International Journal of Game Theory 20:255{268
7
